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ABSTRACT 
This paper develops an overlapping generations (OLG) model with exogenous and endogenous 
retirement age to examine the effects of fertility on long-run pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pensions. We find 
that in both cases, pensions may not necessarily increase with the fertility rate. In the case with 
exogenous retirement age, an increase in the fertility rate (retirement age) may raise pensions when the 
output elasticity of capital is low. When the output elasticity of capital is high, an increase in the fertility 
rate (retirement age) will reduce (raise) pensions if the tax rate is sufficiently high. In the case with 
endogenous retirement age, a higher fertility rate will reduce pensions if the fertility rate is sufficiently 
high, but such a change will raise pensions if the output elasticity of capital and the tax rate are 
sufficiently low. Our results indicate that raising the fertility rate is more likely to reduce pensions in 
developing countries than in developed countries, while such a change tends to raise pensions for 
countries with sufficiently low output elasticity of capital and tax rate. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the past century, many developed countries have witnessed steady declines in their fertility rate 
and mortality rate, leading to concerns about the sustainability of social security systems, particularly 
the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system. There is a huge amount of literature devoted to possible 
solutions to the problem of the increasing pension burden caused by aging populations. One possible 
solution is to reform the pension system from unfunded schemes to funded schemes. Since such a 
reform would cause a dramatic effect on individuals during the transition,1 the provision for child 
allowances and the postponement of retirement have become popular governmental policies in recent 
decades, with the common belief that raising the fertility rate or delaying retirement would lead to a 
situation where more workers support fewer old people, thus reducing the burden placed upon 
government budgets. The provision for child allowances is quite common nowadays in many 
developed countries such as Australia, Japan and Sweden. The provision of child allowances reduces the 
cost of raising children, and parents then have stronger incentives to have more children. With more 
workers to support old people, the burden placed upon government budgets will be reduced. The 
effects of child allowances on fertility and pensions are examined by van Groezen, Leers and 
Meijdam (2003) based on an overlapping generations (OLG) model with a PAYG pension system 
and endogenous fertility decision. 
However, the consensus that an increase in the fertility rate leads to a positive impact on 
pensions has been questioned by Cigno (2007), who argues that “The combined effect of fewer births, 
longer lives and sluggish retirement age is putting public pension system, all essentially pay-as-you-
go, under increasing strain.” Recently, Fanti and Gori (2012) analytically examine the effect of fertility 
on pensions based on a model with a PAYG pension system and exogenous fertility rate and find that 
pensions do not necessarily increase with the fertility rate. Although increasing fertility raises the labor 
force and generates a positive effect on pensions, it also causes a negative effect due to the general 
equilibrium feedback of the wage rate. 
Previous studies concerning the effects of fertility on pensions tend to ignore the role of retirement 
which is also an important determinant to pensions. The postponement of retirement means that workers 
work longer and benefit from pensions for a shorter length of time. By assuming that the population is 
constant, Miyazaki (2014a) and in Miyazaki (2014b) respectively examine the influences of retirement 
on pensions in a model with exogenous and endogenous retirement age.2 Thus, in prior pension crisis 
                                                 
1  See Zhang and Zhang (2003) for a comparison of unfunded and funded social security systems. 
2  Michel and Pestieau (2013) also consider a model with exogenous and endogenous retirement age. Unlike 
this paper which focuses on the interaction between fertility and retirement age and how this interaction 
affects pensions, both Michel and Pestieau (2013) and Miyazaki (2014b) focus on the retirement age and 
optimal PAYG social security policy. Thus, fertility is not considered in their studies.  
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studies there has been a tendency to study the effects of fertility and retirement time on pensions 
separately, thereby ignoring the interaction between fertility and retirement. 
This paper develops an OLG model with retirement to examine the effect of fertility on long-run 
PAYG pensions. Two types of retirement age are considered: exogenous and endogenous retirement 
age. Since our focus is the influence of fertility on pensions, we follow Fanti and Gori (2012) and 
assume that the fertility rate is exogenously given. Workers are composed of adults and old agents. 
Adults need to work in order to consume and to raise children. Adults supply labor inelastically while 
old agents need to work for a fraction of time in old age. After they retire, they enjoy pension benefits. 
Government implements the PAYG social security system. All workers need to pay income tax to 
support the pensions.  
In the first case with exogenous retirement age, since we do not distinguish between retirement 
age and official pension age and assume that old agents are eligible for pensions after they retire as 
regulated by law, our model allows us to study the effects of an increase in the official pension age 
on pensions. The postponement of official pension age is also a commonly used policy to solve the 
problem of pension crisis. For examine, in Australia, men and women currently aged 65 are eligible for 
the age pension. The Australian government announced in 2009 that the Age Pension age will start 
increasing from 2017 and reach 76 years of age by 2023.  
We find that increasing the fertility rate or official pension age does not necessarily raise pensions.  
Such a change in fertility or official pension age causes a positive direct effect due to more labor 
contributing to pensions and a negative effect due to decreases in the equilibrium wage and savings. Our 
results indicate that the output elasticity of capital plays an important role in determining the effects of 
fertility and official pension age on pension benefits since it governs the general equilibrium feedback of 
the wage rate. Besides the output elasticity of capital, other important determinants include the level of 
the fertility rate, the costs of rearing children and the tax rate. When the output elasticity of capital is 
low, an increase in the fertility rate will reduce pensions if the fertility rate (or the cost of rearing 
children) is sufficiently high and vice versa. Similar results also can be found when the output elasticity 
of capital is high and the tax rate is low. However, when both the output elasticity of capital and the tax 
rate are high, an increase in the fertility rate will cause a negative effect on pensions. Regarding the 
effects of official pension age, we find that when the output elasticity of capital is low, there will be a 
positive relationship between official pension age and pensions. When the output elasticity of capital is 
high, an increase in official pension age will reduce pensions if tax rate is low, but such a change will 
raise pensions if the tax rate is high. 
In the second case with endogenous retirement, old agents can choose how long they want to work; 
that is, they can choose the time to retire. The endogeneity of retirement age allows the change in 
fertility to affect retirement and this will in turn affect pensions. We also find that pensions do not 
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necessarily increase with the fertility rate in this case. Although an increase in fertility causes a positive 
direct effect due to more workers contributing to pensions, it also induces two negative effects due to 
decreases in the elderly’s working time and the equilibrium wage. An increase in the fertility rate (tax 
rate) reduces the elderly’s working time. A higher fertility rate will reduce pensions if the fertility rate is 
sufficiently high, but such a change will raise pensions if the output elasticity of capital and the tax rate 
are sufficiently low.  
Comparing results in the cases with exogenous and endogenous retirement age, we find that an 
increase in the fertility rate will tend to reduce pensions if the fertility rate is sufficiently high in 
both cases. This implies that raising the fertility rate is more likely to reduce pensions in developing 
countries than in developed countries since developing countries usually have higher fertility rates. 
Furthermore, in both cases, a positive relationship between fertility and pensions is more likely to 
happen for countries with sufficiently low output elasticity of capital and tax rate. If costs of rearing 
children are sufficiently low, an increase in the fertility rate will tend to raise pensions, regardless of 
the type of retirement. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a model with 
exogenous retirement time. The effects of fertility and the official pension age on long-run pension 
benefits are also examined in this section. Section 3 develops a model with endogenous retirement 
time and analyzes the effects of fertility on long-run pension benefits. Section 4 concludes. 
2.  THE MODEL WITH EXOGENOUS RETIREMENT AGE 
We consider an overlapping generations model with PAYG pensions. Agents live for three periods 
- childhood, adulthood (parenthood), and old age. In each period, agents are endowed with one unit 
of time. Adults with population ௧ܰ  spend all their time working to earn wages ݓ௧ . When they 
become old, they work at a fraction of time ݈௧ାଵ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ to earn wages ݓ௧ାଵ. After they retire, they 
receive pensions provided by the government. Agents care about their consumption in adulthood (ܿ௧) 
and in old age (ܿ௧ାଵ) as well as leisure in old age ሺ1 െ ݈௧ାଵሻ. The utility function, which is identical 
for all agents, is defined as:  
                                                    ݑ௧ ൌ lnܿ௧ ൅ ߚlnܿ௧ାଵ ൅ ൅ߛlnሺ1 െ ݈௧ାଵሻ,					                           (1) 
where ߚ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ is the discount factor, and ߛ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ is the weight of leisure in the utility function. 
All decisions are made in adulthood. Following Fanti and Gori (2012), we assume that the 
number of children (n) is exogenous. It takes a fixed proportion (ݍ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ) of each adult’s wage to 
raise a child (see, e.g., Wigger 1999; Boldrin and Jones 2002; Fanti and Gori 2012). In order to pay 
for pensions for the elderly, the government levies an income tax with the rate ߬ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ. Let ݏ௧ 
represent savings in the adulthood, then the budget constraint for an adult is:     
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																																																											ܿ௧ ൅ ݏ௧ ൅ ݊ݍݓ௧ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻݓ௧.																																																				ሺ2ሻ 
The budget constraint for an old agent is:     
                             ܿ௧ାଵ ൌ ܴ௧ାଵݏ௧ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߠ݈௧ାଵݓ௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݈௧ାଵሻ ௧ܲାଵ,                      (3) 
where ܴ௧ାଵ is the gross rate of return of savings, ௧ܲାଵ is the pensions per unit of time and ߠ ൐ 0 is 
the productivity of an old agent.3 
The government runs a balanced budget. Given that the tax revenue is used to provide 
pensions for the old, this implies that: 
                                        ሺ1 െ ݈௧ାଵሻ ௧ܰ ௧ܲାଵ ൌ ߬ݓ௧ାଵሺ ௧ܰାଵ ൅ ߠ݈௧ାଵ ௧ܰሻ.                        (4) 
Output is produced by using capital (Kt) and effective labor (ܮ௧ ൌ ௧ܰ ൅ ߠ݈௧ ௧ܰିଵ) and is based 
on the Cobb-Douglas production function ௧ܻ ൌ ܣܭ௧ఈܮ௧ଵିఈ , where ܣ ൐ 0		and		ߙ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ  is the 
output elasticity of capital. We define ݇௧ ൌ ܭ௧/ܮ௧. The gross rate of the return on capital and the 
real wage rate are respectively: 
																																																																													ܴ௧ ൌ ߙܣ݇௧ఈିଵ,																																																													ሺ5ሻ	
																																																																											ݓ௧ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻܣ݇௧ఈ.																																																							ሺ6ሻ 
2.1  Equilibrium and steady state 
We first consider a model with exogenous retirement age; that is, ݈௧ାଵ ൌ ݈. We do not distinguish 
between retirement age and official pension age and assume that old agents are eligible for pensions 
at age ሺ2 ൅ 	݈ሻ as regulated by law. Adults decide how much to consume, and how much they 
should save for their old age. The optimal decision of ݏ௧ is: 
																																				ݏ௧ ൌ ߚ
ሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻݓ௧
1 ൅ ߚ െ
ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߠ݈ݓ௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݈ሻ ௧ܲାଵ
ሺ1 ൅ ߚሻܴ௧ାଵ .																									ሺ7ሻ 
Market clearing in the capital market indicates that ሺ݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻ݇௧ାଵ ൌ ݏ௧. Using (4)-(7), the law of 
motion of ݇௧ is: 
																																											݇௧ାଵ ൌ ߙሺ1 െ ߙሻܣߚ
ሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻ
ሺ݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻߙሺ1 ൅ ߚሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ߬݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻ ݇௧
ఈ.																													ሺ8ሻ 
Equation (8) implies that there exists a unique, globally stable steady state ݇∗: 
																																		݇∗ ൌ ݇∗ሺ݊, ݈ሻ ൌ ቈ ߙሺ1 െ ߙሻܣߚሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻߙሺ1 ൅ ߚሻሺ݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ߬݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻ቉
ଵ
ଵିఈ .																	ሺ9ሻ 
To ensure ݇∗ ൐ 0, we assume that 1 െ ߬ ൏ ݍ݊. 
2.2  Pensions 
                                                 
3  Sala-i-Martin (1996) argues that old workers are less productive than young workers due to the depreciation 
of human capital. 
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Let ݓ∗ represent the steady-state wage rate; that is,  ݓ∗ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ݇∗ሻఈ. Equation (4) implies that 
the steady-state pensions per efficiency unit of labor (݌∗) can be re-written as: 
																																																						݌∗ ൌ ߬ݓ
∗ሺ݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻ
1 െ ݈ ൌ ݌
∗ሺ݊, ݈, ݇∗ሺ݊, ݈ሻሻ.																																					ሺ10ሻ 
From (10), we derive: 
 
* * * * *
* *
dp p p w k
dx x w k x
   

   
   

,                                         (11) 
where ݔ ൌ ݊, ݈. Although a higher fertility rate (retirement age) means more labor contributing to 
pensions (direct effect), the lower equilibrium wage rate reduces savings and capital accumulation, 
causing pensions per efficiency unit of labor to decrease (indirect effect). Fertility or retirement age 
and pensions are positively (negatively) correlated if the direct (indirect) effect dominates. 
Combining (4), (6) and (9), we can derive long-run PAYG pensions per efficiency unit of 
labor as: 
																	݌∗ ൌ ߬ሺ݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻ1 െ ݈ ቊܣሺ1 െ ߙሻ ቈ
ߙߚሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻ
ߙሺ1 ൅ ߚሻሺ݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ߬݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻ቉
ఈ
ቋ
ଵ
ଵିఈ
.							ሺ12ሻ 
Proposition 1.  (1) For ߙ ∈ ሺ0, ଵଶሿ, then 
ௗ௣∗
ௗ௡ ൏ 0 (
ௗ௣∗
ௗ௡ ൐ 0) if the fertility rate is sufficiently large 
(small). (2) For ߙ ∈ ሺଵଶ , 1ሻ, there exists a unique ߬௡  such that if  ߬ ൏ ߬௡ , then 
ௗ௣∗
ௗ௡ ൏ 0 (
ௗ௣∗
ௗ௡ ൐ 0) if the fertility rate is sufficiently large (small). If  ߬ ൐ ߬௡, then 
ௗ௣∗
ௗ௡ ൏ 0. 
Proof:   From (12), we have: 
݀݌∗
݀݊ ൌ
߬ሾെݍߦଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߦଶሿ
1 െ ݈ ቊ
ܣሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߙߚሿఈሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻଶఈିଵ
ߙሺ1 ൅ ߚሻሺ݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ߬݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻቋ
ଵ
ଵିఈ, 
where  
 ߦଵ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻ݊ଶ[ߙሺ1 ൅ ߚሻ ൅ ߬ሺ1 െ ߙሻሿ ൅ ሺ݊ ൅ ߙߠ݈ሻሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻߠ݈ ൐ 0,  
 ߦଶ ൌ ሺ1 െ 2ߙሻ݊[ߙሺ1 ൅ ߚሻ ൅ ߬ሺ1 െ ߙሻሿ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻߠ݈. 
Note that ߦଶ ൐ 0 if ߙ ∈ ሺ0, ଵଶሿ	. The sign of 
ௗ௣∗
ௗ௡  is determined by ሾെݍߦଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߦଶሿ. We can 
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re-write ሾെݍߦଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߦଶሿ  as: 
																ሾെݍߦଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߦଶሿ ൌ ݊[ߙሺ1 ൅ ߚሻ ൅ ߬ሺ1 െ ߙሻሾെݍሺ1 െ ߙሻ݊ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ 2ߙሻሿ	
														൅ሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻߠ݈ሾെݍሺ݊ ൅ ߙߠ݈ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߙሻሿ. 
Define ݊ଵ ൌ ሺଵିఛሻሺଵିଶఈሻ௤ሺଵିఈሻ  and ݊ଶ ൌ
ሺଵିఛሻሺଵିఈሻି௤ఈఏ௟
௤ . Note that ሾെݍሺ1 െ ߙሻ݊ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ 2ߙሻሿ ൏
0  if ݊ ൐ ݊ଵ  and vice versa. Moreover, ሾെݍሺ݊ ൅ ߙߠ݈ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߙሻሿ ൏ 0  if ݊ ൐ ݊ଶ  and vice 
versa. Then ௗ௣
∗
ௗ௡ ൏ 0 if the fertility rate is sufficiently large such that ݊ ൐ ݉ܽݔሼ݊ଵ, ݊ଶሽ and 
ௗ௣∗
ௗ௡ ൐ 0 
if the fertility rate is sufficiently small such that ݊ ൏ ݉݅݊ሼ݊ଵ, ݊ଶሽ. 
If ߙ ∈ ሺଵଶ , 1ሻ, then ߦଶ ൐ 0 if ߬ ൏ ߬௡ ൌ
ሺଵିఈሻሺଵାఈఉሻఏ௟ିሺଶఈିଵሻ௡ఈሺଵାఉሻ
ሺଶఈିଵሻ௡ሺଵିఈሻ . This implies that 
ௗ௣∗
ௗ௡ ൏ 0 
if the fertility rate is sufficiently large such that ݊ ൐ ݉ܽݔሼ݊ଵ, ݊ଶሽ and ௗ௣
∗
ௗ௡ ൐ 0 if the fertility rate is 
sufficiently small such that ݊ ൏ ݉݅݊ሼ݊ଵ, ݊ଶሽ. If ߬ ൐ ߬௡, then ߦଶ ൏ 0, implying  ௗ௣
∗
ௗ௡ ൏ 0. 
QED.  
Recall that an increase in fertility generates two opposite effects on ݌∗ . When the output 
elasticity of capital is lower than ଵଶ, the effect of fertility on pensions per efficiency unit of labor 
depends on the level of fertility rate. When the fertility rate is sufficiently large, the contribution of 
more labor (due to an increase in the fertility rate) to ݌∗ is small. Therefore, the negative effect 
caused by an increase in the fertility rate on pensions outweighs its positive effect, causing a 
reduction in  ݌∗. This result will be reversed if the fertility rate is sufficiently small. If the fertility 
rate is between ݊ଵ and ݊ଶ, then we need to consider the costs of rearing children (ݍ) in order to 
determine the sign of  ௗ௣
∗
ௗ௡ . Defining ݍ௡ ൌ
ሺଵିఛሻకమ
కభ , then ሾെݍߦଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߦଶሿ ൏ 0 if ݍ ൐ ݍ௡ and vice 
versa. This implies that there exists a unique ݍ௡ ൐ 0 such that ௗ௣
∗
ௗ௡ ൏ 0 if ݍ ൐ ݍ௡ and vice versa. 
The reason is that the higher costs of rearing children induce lower savings and capital 
accumulation and result in a negative effect of ݊ on ݌∗.  
When ߙ ൐ ଵଶ, the effect of fertility on pensions per efficiency unit of labor depends on the tax 
rate. On the one hand, a higher tax rate directly increases contributions to ݌∗. On the other hand, it 
reduces ݌∗ indirectly due to lower after-tax income and savings. We find that if the tax rate is 
sufficiently low such that ߬ ൏ ߬௡, then the effect of an increase in fertility on ݌∗ is similar to the 
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case of ߙ ൑ ଵଶ and that an increase in the fertility rate may increase or decrease ݌∗, depending on the 
values of ݊ and ݍ. However, if the tax rate is sufficiently high such that ߬ ൐ ߬௡, then an increase in 
fertility reduces ݌∗, regardless of the values of ݊ and ݍ. Notice that డఛ೙డ௟ ൐ 0 and 
డఛ೙
డఏ ൐ 0, impliying 
that earlier retirement age and lower productivity of the old decreases the critical value of the tax 
rate (߬௡). Since developing countries tend to have higher fertility rates, a higher value of ߙ and a 
lower value of ߬௡  (due to early retirement age and low productivity of old workers), then an 
increase in fertility is very likely to reduce ݌∗ in these countries. 
The following proposition concerns the effect of retirement age (official pension age) on 
pensions. 
Proposition 2.  There exists a unique ߙ௟ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ such that: (1) for ߙ ∈ ሺ0, ߙ௟ሿ, then ௗ௣
∗
ௗ௟ ൐ 0; (2) 
for ߙ ∈ ሺߙ௟, 1ሻ, then there exists a unique ߬௟ such that ௗ௣
∗
ௗ௟ ൏ 0 if ߬ ൏ ߬௟ and vice 
versa. 
Proof:  From (12), we have: 
݀݌∗
݈݀ ൌ
߬ሺߦଷ ൅ ߦସሻ
ሺ1 െ ݈ሻଶሺ1 െ ߙሻ ൤
ܣሺ1 െ ߙሻሾߙߚሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻሿఈ
ߙሺ1 ൅ ߚሻሺ݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ߬݊ ൅ ߠ݈ሻ൨
ଵ
ଵିఈ, 
where  
 ߦଷ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻ݊ሺߠ ൅ ݊ሻሾߙሺ1 ൅ ߚሻ ൅ ߬ሺ1 െ ߙሻሿ ൐ 0,  
 ߦସ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻߠሼ݈ሾߠሺ1 ൅ ݈ሻ ൅ ݊ሿ െ ߙሺ2ߠ݈ ൅ ݊ሻሽ. 
Define ߙ௟ ൌ ௟ሾఏሺଵା௟ሻା௡ሿଶఏ௟ା௡ . Note that 0 ൏ ߙ௟ ൏ 1.  If ߙ ൑ ߙ௟, then ߦସ ൒ 0, implying 
ௗ௣∗
ௗ௟ ൐ 0. 
If ߙ ∈ ሺߙ௟, 1ሻ , then ߦସ ൏ 0 . Define ߬௟ ൌ ሺଵାఈఉሻఏሼି௟ሾఏሺଵା௟ሻା௡ሿାఈሺଶఏ௟ା௡ሻሽିሺଵିఈሻ௡ሺఏା௡ሻఈሺଵାఉሻ௡ሺఏା௡ሻሺଵିఈሻమ . 
Thus, ௗ௣
∗
ௗ௟ ൏ 0 if ߬ ൏ ߬௟ and vice versa. 
QED.  
Because the lower the output elasticity of capital is, the smaller the reduction in wages caused 
by the postponement of retirement age (official pension age), then ௗ௣
∗
ௗ௟ ൐ 0 if ߙ ൏ ߙ௟ . If ߙ ൐ ߙ௟ , 
then the postponement of retirement age will cause a larger reduction in wages and the results will 
depend on ߬. Our results are different from Miyazaki (2014a) who finds that ݌∗ will increase in ݈ if 
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݈ is sufficiently high, regardless of the value of ߙ. Note that ߙ௟ depends on ݊, ݈, and ߠ with డఈ೗డ௡ ൏ 0, 
డఈ೗
డ௟ ൐ 0, and 
డఈ೗
డఏ ൐ 0. Since the critical value ߙ௟ tends to be higher in developed countries due to 
lower fertility, higher retirement age and higher productivity of old workers, it is very likely that 
postponing the official pension age would increase ݌∗ in developed countries.  
3.  THE MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS RETIREMENT 
In this section, we consider a model where retirement age is endogenously determined by agents. 
We now allow agents to choose to work at a fraction of time ݈௧ାଵ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ to earn wages ݓ௧ାଵ in the 
old age. After they retire, they receive pensions provided by the government. The budget constraint 
for an adult is the same as (2) while the budget constraint for an old agent is the same as (3). The 
government budget is given by (4). Factor prices are given by (5) and (6). 
3.1  Equilibrium and steady state 
The optimal decisions of ܿ௧ and ݈௧ାଵ are: 
																												ܿ௧ ൌ
ሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻݓ௧
1 ൅ ߚ ൅
ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߠ݈௧ାଵݓ௧ାଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݈௧ାଵሻ ௧ܲାଵ
ሺ1 ൅ ߚሻܴ௧ାଵ ,																						ሺ13ሻ 
																																	݈௧ାଵ ൌ ߠߚ
ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߙሻ െ ሾߙߛ ൅ ߬ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺߚ ൅ ߛሻሿ݊
ߠሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ .																											ሺ14ሻ 
Equation (14) indicates that working time for the elderly is constant; that is, ݈௧ାଵ ൌ ሚ݈. Note that 
ሚ݈ ൏ 1. In order to guarantee that ሚ݈ ൐ 0, we assume that ߠ ൐ ሾఈఊାఛሺଵିఈሻሺఉାఊሻሿ௡ఉሺଵିఛሻሺଵିఈሻ . From (14), we have: 
																																																										݀ ሚ݈݀݊ ൌ െ
ߙߛ ൅ ߬ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺߚ ൅ ߛሻ
ߠሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ ൏ 0.																																					ሺ15ሻ 
																																																									݀ ሚ݈݀߬ ൌ െ
ሺ1 െ ߙሻሾߠߚ ൅ ሺߚ ൅ ߛሻ݊ሿ
ߠሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ ൏ 0.																																			ሺ16ሻ 
Equation (15) indicates that an increase in fertility reduces working time in old age. On the one 
hand, the increase in the fertility rate will result, ceteris paribus, in a higher expenditure on raising 
children and lower savings. This will motivate old agents to work longer. On the other hand, the 
increase in the fertility rate means higher pensions due to more workers contributing to pension 
funds, which will cause old agents to retire earlier. As the fertility rate increases, the second effect 
will dominate the first effect and the overall working time for the elderly will decrease. Concerning 
the effect of the tax rate on the elderly’s working time, we find that although an increase in the tax 
rate lowers the motivation to work and reduces the working time for the elderly, the lower after-tax 
income induces the elderly to work longer. Equation (16) shows that an increase in the tax rate 
makes old agents retire earlier. 
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Using (2), (4)-(6), (13) and (14), we can derive savings as: 
																															ݏ௧ ൌ 1 െ ߙ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛ ቈሺߚ ൅ ߛሻሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻܣ݇௧
ఈ െ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߠߙ ݇௧ାଵ቉.																		ሺ17ሻ 
Market clearing in the capital market indicates that ሺ݊ ൅ ߠ݈௧ାଵሻ݇௧ାଵ ൌ ݏ௧ . This implies the 
following law of motion of ݇௧: 
																																											݇௧ାଵ ൌ ߙܣ
ሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ
ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሾߙ݊ሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻሿ ݇௧
ఈ.																											ሺ18ሻ 
Equation (18) implies that there exists a unique, globally stable-steady state ݇∗: 
																																												݇∗ ൌ ቈ ߙܣሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿሺ1 െ ߬ሻሾߙ݊ሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻሿ቉
ଵ
ଵିఈ .																									ሺ19ሻ 
Under the assumption that 1 െ ߬ ൏ ݍ݊, we ensure ݇∗ ൐ 0. Differentiating (19) with respect to the 
fertility rate yields: 
																							݀݇
∗
݀݊ ൌ െ
ሾߙሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ݍߠሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻሿ݇∗
ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻሾߙ݊ሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻሿ ൏ 0.																ሺ20ሻ 
Equation (20) indicates that an increase in the fertility rate reduces savings and the accumulation of 
capital, resulting in a lower ݇∗. 
3.2  Pensions 
Equation (4) implies that the steady-state pensions per efficiency unit of labor can be re-written as: 
																																																																									݌∗ ൌ ߬ݓ
∗൫݊ ൅ ߠሚ݈൯
1 െ ሚ݈ .																																																					ሺ21ሻ 
Substituting (14) and (19) into (21) yields:  
      ݌∗ ൌ ݌∗ሺ݊, ሚ݈ሺ݊ሻ, ݇∗ሺ݊ሻሻ.                                          (22) 
Differentiating (22) with respect to	݊ gives: 
  
* * * * * *
* *
dp p p l p w k
dn n n w k nl
    

           



.                               (23) 
Equation (23) shows that an increase in the fertility rate will cause three effects on pensions: one 
positive direct effect and two negative indirect effects. First, a higher fertility rate means that more 
workers contribute to ݌∗ (direct effect). Second, the higher fertility rate causes old agents to retire 
earlier and reduces ݌∗  (indirect effect). Third, the lower equilibrium wage rate caused by the 
increasing fertility rate reduces ݌∗ (indirect effect). Depending on the magnitude of these effects, 
the fertility rate may increase or decrease ݌∗ . The following proposition provides a sufficient 
condition for ௗ௣
∗
ௗ௡ ൏ 0. 
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Proposition 3.  An increase in the fertility rate will reduce pensions per efficiency unit of labor if 
the fertility rate is sufficiently large. 
Proof:   Substituting (15) and (20) into (23) yields: 
					݀݌
∗
݀݊ ൌ
߬ݓ∗ሾߙሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻߦଷ ൅ ߠሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻߦସሿ
ሺ1 െ ݈ሻଶሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻሾߙ݊ሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻሿሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ,			ሺ24ሻ 
where  
 ߦଷ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሼെ൫1 െ ሚ݈൯ߙ൫݊ ൅ ߠሚ݈൯ሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻଶߛሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻ݊ሽ,  
and  
 ߦସ ൌ െ൫1 െ ሚ݈൯ߙݍ൫݊ ൅ ߠሚ݈൯ሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻଶሺ1 െ ߬ሻߛሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻ. 
Define ߯ ൌ ߬ሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻߙߛ ൐ 0 . Using (14) to substitute ሚ݈ in ߦଷ  and ߦସ , we 
have: 
ߦଷ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߙሻ ቊെߠ
ሼሾሺ1 െ ߙሻ߬ߚ ൅ ߛሿ ൅ ߯݊ሽߙሺ1 െ ߬ሻሾ݊ሺߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠߚሿ
ߠሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ
൅ ߛሺ1 െ ߙሻ݊ሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻቋ, 
and 
ߦସ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߙሻ ቊെሼ
ሾሺ1 െ ߙሻ߬ߚ ൅ ߛሿ ൅ ߯݊ሽߙݍሾ݊ሺߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠߚሿ
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߛሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻቋ. 
We re-write ߦଷ as: 
				ߦଷ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߙሻ ቊ݊ ቈߛሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻ െ ߯ߙ
ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሾ݊ሺߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠߚሿ
ߠሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ ቉
െ ߠሾሺ1 െ ߙሻ߬ߚ ൅ ߛሿߙሺ1 െ ߬ሻሾ݊ሺߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠߚሿߠሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ ቋ. 
Therefore, ߦଷ ൏ 0 if ߛሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻ ൏ ఞఈሺଵିఛሻሾ௡ሺఉାఊሻାఏఉሿఏሾሺଵିఈሻఉାఊሿ . This implies that ߦଷ ൏ 0 if 
																																							݊ ൐ ݊ଷ ൌ ߛ
ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሼሺ1 െ ߙሻߠሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ െ ߯ߙߠߚሽ
ߛሺ1 െ ߙሻݍߠሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ ൅ ߯ߙሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺߚ ൅ ߛሻ. 
Note that  
ߦସ ൏ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߙሻ ቊെ
ሾሺ1 െ ߙሻ߬ߚ ൅ ߛሿߙݍሾ݊ሺߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠߚሿ
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߛሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻቋ. 
Therefore, ߦସ ൏ 0  if ିሾሺଵିఈሻఛఉାఊሿఈ௤ሾ௡ሺఉାఊሻାఏఉሿሺଵିఈሻఉାఊ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߛሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻ ൏ 0 . This implies that 
ߦସ ൏ 0 if 
݊ ൐ ݊ସ ൌ
ሺ1 െ ߙሻߛሺ1 െ ߬ሻሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ െ ሾሺ1 െ ߙሻ߬ߚ ൅ ߛሿߙݍߠߚ
ݍሼߚሺ1 െ ߙሻߛߠሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ ൅ ሾሺ1 െ ߙሻ߬ߚ ൅ ߛሿߙሺߚ ൅ ߛሻሽ. 
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Therefore, if ݊ is sufficiently large such that ݊ ൐ ݉ܽݔ	ሼ݊ଷ, ݊ସሽ, then ߦଷ ൏ 0 and ߦସ ൏ 0. From (24), 
we have ௗ௣
∗
ௗ௡ ൏ 0 if ݊ is sufficiently large such that such that ݊ ൐ ݉ܽݔ	ሼ݊ଷ, ݊ସሽ. 
QED.  
Recall that an increase in fertility generates three effects on ݌∗. When the fertility rate is high, 
an increase in fertility will induce a small positive direct effect on ݌∗. However, it will cause large 
reductions in the elderly’s working time and wages, resulting in a large decrease in ݌∗. Proposition 
3 demonstrates that if the fertility rate is sufficiently large, then an increase in the fertility rate will 
reduce ݌∗. Comparing Proposition 3 with Proposition 1, we find that an increase in the fertility rate 
is very likely to reduce ݌∗ if the fertility rate is sufficiently large, regardless how retirement age is 
determined. Because developing countries usually have higher fertility rates, an increase in the 
fertility rate is more likely to reduce ݌∗ in these countries than in developed countries. 
The following proposition provides a sufficient condition for ௗ௣
∗
ௗ௡ ൐ 0 . In particular, we 
concern how the tax rate affects the influence of the fertility rate on pensions.  
Proposition 4.  An increase in the fertility rate will raise pensions per efficiency unit of labor if 
the output elasticity of capital and the tax rate are sufficiently low. 
Proof:  Since 0 ൏ ሚ݈ ൏ 1, we have: 
ߦଷ ൐ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻ൛െߙ൫݊ ൅ ߠሚ݈൯ሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻଶߛሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻ݊ൟ, 
and 
ߦସ ൐ െߙݍ൫݊ ൅ ߠሚ݈൯ሾሺ1 െ ߙሻߚ ൅ ߛሿ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻଶሺ1 െ ߬ሻߛሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻ. 
Using (14) to substitute ሚ݈ in ߦଷ and ߦସ, we have: 
																			ߙሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻߦଷ ൅ ߠሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻߦସ 
൐ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߙሻሼെߙሾߙሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠݍሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻሿሾ݊ሺߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠߚሿ 
																								൅ሺ1 െ ߙሻߛሺ1 െ ߬ െ ݍ݊ሻሾߙ݊ሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻሿሽ 
																			ൌ ሺ1 െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ߙሻሺെ߬ߦହ ൅ ߦ଺ሻ, 
where 
ߦହ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߛሾߙ݊ሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻሿ െ ߙଶሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻሾ݊ሺߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠߚሿ, 
and 
																ߦ଺ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻߛሺ1 െ ݍ݊ሻሾߙ݊ሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻሿ 
																									െߙሾߙሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠݍሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻሿሾ݊ሺߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠߚሿ. 
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Note that ߦହ ൐ ߦ଺.  
We can re-write ߦ଺ as: 
ߦ଺ ൌ ߙሺ1 ൅ ߚ ൅ ߛሻሼሺ1 െ ߙሻߛሺ1 െ ݍ݊ሻ݊ െ ߙሾ݊ሺߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠߚሿሽ 
					൅ߠሺ1 ൅ ߙߚሻሼሺ1 െ ߙሻߛሺ1 െ ݍ݊ሻ െ ߙݍሾ݊ሺߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠߚሿሽ. 
Thus, ߦ଺ ൐ 0  if ሺ1 െ ߙሻߛሺ1 െ ݍ݊ሻ݊ ൐ ߙሾ݊ሺߚ ൅ ߛሻ ൅ ߠߚሿ  and ሺ1 െ ߙሻߛሺ1 െ ݍ݊ሻ ൐ ߙݍሾ݊ሺߚ ൅
ߛሻ ൅ ߠߚሿ. Define ߙଵ ൌ ఊሺଵି௤௡ሻ௡ఊሺଵି௤௡ሻ௡ା௡ሺఉାఊሻାఏఉ ൏ 1 and ߙଶ ൌ
ఊሺଵି௤௡ሻ
ఊሺଵି௤௡ሻା௤ሾ௡ሺఉାఊሻାఏఉሿ ൏ 1. Then ߦ଺ ൐ 0 
if ߙ is sufficiently small such that ߙ ൏ ݉݅݊ሺߙଵ, ߙଶሻ. Since ߦହ ൐ ߦ଺, then ߦହ ൐ 0 if ߦ଺ ൐ 0. It also 
implies that కలకఱ ൏ 1. Thus, 
ௗ௣∗
ௗ௡ ൐ 0 if ߙ ൏ ݉݅݊ሺߙଵ, ߙଶሻ and ߬ ൏
కల
కఱ. 
QED.  
When the output elasticity of capital is low, an increase in the fertility rate causes a small 
reduction in wages, generating a small reduction in ݌∗ . Concerning the effect of the tax rate, 
although a lower tax rate directly decreases contributions to ݌∗, such a change also induces two 
indirect effects on ݌∗. First, it raises ݌∗ due to higher after-tax income and savings. Second, as 
indicated by (16), a lower tax rate makes old agents delay their retirement, leading to an increase in 
݌∗ due to more contributions to pensions. We find that if the output elasticity of capital and the tax 
rate are sufficiently low, then an increase in the fertility rate causes an overall increase in ݌∗. Notice 
that డఛ೙డ௤ ൏ 0. Since a lower ݍ implies a higher threshold ߬௡, then for those countries with low costs 
of raising children, an increase in the fertility rate tends to raise ݌∗. Proposition 1 demonstrates that 
when retirement age is exogenously given, then ௗ௣
∗
ௗ௡ ൏ 0 if the output elasticity of capital and the tax 
rate are sufficiently high. Then a comparison between Proposition 4 and Proposition 1 indicates that 
regardless of the type of retirement, a positively relationship between the fertility rate and ݌∗ is more 
likely to be found in an economy with sufficiently low output elasticity of capital and tax rate. 
Furthermore, if costs of rearing children are sufficiently low, it is very likely that higher fertility 
rate will generate higher ݌∗, regardless of the type of retirement . 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we examine the effect of the fertility rate on PAYG pensions based on an overlapping 
generations model with exogenous and endogenous retirement age. Although most people believe 
that increasing fertility (or delaying retirement age) would raise pensions, our results suggest that 
governments should also take economic variables such as the level of the fertility rate, the costs of 
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rearing children, the output elasticity of capital, and the tax rate into consideration when looking 
into the problem of a pension crisis. 
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